

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

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EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE FROM AMBASSADOR

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDEV, RH, UK, BC
SUBJECT: RHODESIA: POSSIBLE INTERNAL AGREEMENT AND POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES

REF: STATE 29697

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ARE OUT ANSWERS TO REFTEL QUESTIONS WHICH ARE
UPPERMOST IN MINDS OF TOP GOB OFFICIALS, DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES AND
OTHERS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED. HOWEVER, THIS REPRESENTS OUR OWN
CONSIDERED AND COLLEGIAL JUDGMENT. END SUMMARY.

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1. HOW LIKELY AND INTERNAL AGREEMENT. THE GOB BELIEVES THE ANNOUNCE-
MENT OF AN INTERNAL "AGREEMENT" IS LIKELY TO BE MADE AT ANY TIME.

2. HOW EVENTS WOULD UNFOLD. THE GOB DOES NOT EQUATE AN AGREEMENT
WITH A SOLUTION. IN FACT, THE ONE CONSTANT FACTOR IN EVERY ESTI-
MATE HEARD HERE IS THAT NO AGREEMENT, WHETHER REACHED IN MALTA OR
SALISBURY, CAN BRING A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THIS DISMAL CON-
CLUSION IS BASED ON GOB CONVICTION THAT: (A) THE EXTERNAL PF
MILITARY FORCES WOULD NOT "MELT AWAY" BUT RATHER CONTINUE TO
FIGHT THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT AND WOULD NOT LACK SUPPORT FOR

DOING SO; (B) WITHIN THE PF, THEY SUSPECT MUGABE WOULD RESORT TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION, E.G. WITH NKOMO, TO PRESS HIS DEMANDS FOR A "REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST" SOLUTION; AND (C) AMONG THE SALISBURY INTERLOCUTORS THERE ARE RIVALRIES AND TENSIONS, E.G. EVEN BETWEEN MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE, THAT CONTAIN THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT. IN ANY EVENT, THE NET RESULT OF THE ABOVE WOULD BE TO CONFIRM THE GOB'S DEEPEST APPREHENSIONS WHICH ARE THE CREATION OF "ANOTHER ANGOLA", I.E. CIVIL STRIFE NEXT DOOR SPILLING OVER INTO BOTSWANA. WHILE IMMEDIATE ALL-OUT CIVIL WAR IS NOT EXPECTED, THE GOB FEARS A "NO WAR, NO PEACE" PERIOD OF INCREASING ARMAMENTS, UNPREDICTABLE DURATION AND LIKELY INCREASING INTERNATIONAL (E.G., SOVIET/CUBAN) INVOLVEMENT.

3. GOB ATTITUDES. THE GOB REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE AAP AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THEY ADMIT TO BEING IMPRESSED BY THE ABSENCE OF POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS OR DISSATISFACTION AMONG RHODESIAN BLACKS WITH THE SALISBURY TALKS; THEIR FIRST REACTION WOULD BE TO EXAMINE AND COMPARE THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL AGREEMENT WITH THE AAP. IF INTERNAL AGREEMENT APPEARED TO EXTEND A GENUINE OFFER OF PARTICIPATION TO THE PF AND WAS NOT FOUND WANTING BY DEMOCRATIC STANDARDS; AND IN THE EVENT IT WERE SUPPORTED (OR AT LEAST NOT REJECTED OUT OF HAND) BY SEVERAL FL AND OAU COUNTRIES, BOTSWANA WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE SUCH AN INTERNAL AGREEMENT

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MENT. IT CANNOT BE OVER EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOB'S ABILITY TO ADOPT SUCH A POSITION WOULD DEPEND UPON CLEAR PUBLIC EVIDENCE THAT THE PF HAD BEEN INVITED TO PARTICIPATE ON DEMOCRATIC TERMS. IF PF REFLECTION OF OFFER OF PARTICIPATION IS CLEAR, THE GOB WOULD EXPECT US TO PRESSURE (IF NOT THREATEN) THE PF TO CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE. FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE IT SEEMS FAR MORE LIKELY THAT AN INTERNAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE FOUND UNACCEPTABLE BY THE GOB BECAUSE (1) ALL THE PARTIES NECESSARY TO BRING PEACE (E.G., THE PF AND FL) WOULD NOT SUPPORT IT, (2) SMITH WOULD STILL HAVE A ROLE, (3) THERE WOULD BE DUAL VOTING ROLLS OR UNACCEPTABLE NUMBER OF ENTRENCHED SEATS. IN THIS EVENT, THE GOB WOULD LOOK TO THE USG AND UK TO PRESS FORWARD VIGOROUSLY WITH THE AAP.

4. OUR OPTIONS.

A. ONE OPTION APPEARS CLEAR, I.E. TO ADHERE TO OUR EARLIER LINE WHEN SMITH ANNOUNCED INTERNAL TALKS, I.E. THAT WE WILL EXAMINE ANY INTERNAL AGREEMENT ON ITS MERITS AND COMPARE IT WITH THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE APP, ESPECIALLY WHETHER IT CAN BE EFFECTIVE BY ENCOMPASSING ALL PARTIES.

B. IF AN INTERNAL AGREEMENT, CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, APPEARED TO OFFER A USEFUL BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, THE QUESTION WOULD BE HOW TO PUSH THE PF TOWARD PARTICIPATION IN IT, GIVEN THE PF'S RESPONSES AND ATTITUDE OF ITS SUPPLIERS, THERE IS NO REAL OBSTACLE TO THEIR PROLONGING AND EVEN INTERNATIONALIZING THE CONFLICT. THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT (OR MINIMIZE) CIVIL WAR IS BY FRONTLINE PRESSURE ON THE PF IN THE FORM OF WITHDRAWING USE OF BASES FOR ZIMBABWEAN NATIONALIST MILITARY FORCES. THIS IMPLIES A KIND OF POWER

AND AUTHORITY WHICH NONE OF THE FRONTLINE STATES HAS OR WOULD BE
WILLING TO EXERCISE.

C. WE THUS EXPECT THAT CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF ANY INTERNAL
AGREEMENT WILL SHOW THAT IT WILL FALL HOPELESSLY SHORT OF AN
INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION PRINCIPALLY ON GROUNDS OF
PF NON-PARTICIPATION. MOST FL FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL ATTEND
THE NEW YORK PROXIMITY TALKS (GOB ACCEPTED WITH ALACRITY,
HAVING SEEN THAT MALTA WAS NOT -- AS THEY FEARED -- "ANOTHER
GENEVA", BUT THAT ON THE CONTRARY FL OBSERVERS PLAYED A USEFUL
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ROLE). NEW YORK WOULD THEREFORE BE THE LOGICAL TIME AND PLACE
TO BEGIN DISCUSSING HOW TO DEAL WITH THE "INTERNAL AGREEMENT"
CONTINGENCY AND TO WORK TOGETHER WITH FL REPS TO PLAN MEETING OF
PRESIDENTS. (IDEALLY, IT SHOULD APPEAR TO BE THEIR INITIATIVE.)
TALKS SHOULD CENTER ON MODALITIES OF MOVING PF TOWARD PARTICIPA-
TION IN AN AGREEMENT BASED ON OR HARMONIZING WITH AAP, WHETHER
IT COMES FROM SALISBURY OR LONDON.

D. SHOULD PF REMAIN UNMOVED BY FL THREATS OR BLANDISHMENTS,
THE COURSE OF ACTION INDICATED FOR US WOULD BE TO ENLIST ASSIS-
TANCE IN PURSUADING FL, ESPECIALLY MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA, TO CLAMP
DOWN ON PF MILITARY OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT FROM THEIR TERRITORY,
IN AN EFFORT TO STIMULATE THE MOVEMENT TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. AT
THE SAME TIME, GOB SHOULD BE ASKED, ASSUMING IT HAS BY THEN THE
NECESSARY MILITARY CAPABILITY, TO REFUSE TO FACILITATE ONWARD
TRANSPORTATION OF ZAPU/ZANU RECRUITS TO TRAINING CAMPS ABROAD.
THE PF IS NOT WINNING POPULARITY CONTESTS BY ITS RIGIDITY AND
DISUNITY; WE MIGHT COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF MUCH OF THE OAU IN
THIS EFFORT.

NORLAND

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